Another court has ignored the Constitution as well as the Supreme Court’s D.C. v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago rulings, when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the Bonidy v. United States Postal Service that gun rights are not protected outside of the home.
The law 39 C.F.R §232.1(I) prohibits the storage and carrying of weapons on USPS property. The district court found the law to be unconstitutional in its applications to parking lots, but not the ban for inside government buildings.
Circuit Judge David M. Ebel agreed with Circuit Judge Gregory A. Phillips stated:
We….conclude that the regulation is constitutional as to all USPS property at issue in this case, including the Avon Post Office parking lot, because the Second Amendment right to bear arms has not been extended to “government buildings.” Government buildings, in this context, includes the government owned parking lot connected to the U.S. Post Office. Alternatively, even if we were to conclude that the parking lot did not qualify as a “government building,” we would uphold this regulation as constitutional as applied to the parking lot under independent intermediate scrutiny.
Ignoring McDonald’s command that the Second Amendment does not protect “second-class” rights, the Tenth Circuit held that “the risk inherent in firearms and other weapons distinguishes the Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights that have been held to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, such as the right to marry and the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination, which can be exercised without creating a direct risk to others.”
In 2010 the Supreme Court stated:
The right to keep and bear arms, however, is not the only constitutional right that has controversial public safety implications. All of the constitutional provisions that impose restrictions on law enforcement and on the prosecution of crimes fall into the same category. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (“The exclusionary rule generates `substantial social costs,’ United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large”); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)(reflecting on the serious consequences of dismissal for a speedy trial violation, which means “a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free”);Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id., at 542, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (White, J., dissenting) (objecting that the Court’s rule “in some unknown number of cases . . . will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets . . . to repeat his crime”);Mapp, 367 U.S., at 659, 81 S.Ct. 1684.
The Tenth Circuit Court however, had this say:
“even assuming a right to bear firearms outside the home, and even if, contrary to our ruling above, the parking lot is not itself considered part of a ‘government building,’ we conclude that any such right Bonidy might possess was not violated here by 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(1) precluding him from possessing a firearm in the postal parking lot.”